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MURRAY SEASONGOOD*
Ohio, in 1912, adopted a municipal Home Rule amendment,
Sections 3 to 14, inclusive, Article XVIII, of its Constitution.
Thus our state became the seventh, with Missouri the bellwether
in 1875, to recognize that municipal corporations should be freed
from the complete control, remote and vften unsympathetic, of
state legislatures.'
Section 3 reads:
"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all
powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce
within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general
laws."
This section is not crystal clear and has called for interpre-
tation. What is the meaning of "all powers of local self-govern-
ment," and of "such local police, sanitary and other similar regula-
tions as are not in conflict with general laws?" Does the latter limit
the former? While this amendment has been declared to be self-
executing,2 the extent to which it emancipates municipal corpora-
tions from state control has been the subject of many decisions of
the Ohio Supreme Court. It is a truism, but one often forgotten,
that no constitution or enactment will, of itself, automatically
achieve the objects for which it was promulgated. There must be
as well, to make it effective, an enlightened citizenship and favor-
able public opinion, created in part and supported by a public-
spirited radio and press. Legislators and courts must be sympa-
thetic rather than indifferent or hostile to its objectives. As ob-
served by the English Bishop of Bangor, Benjamin Hoadly, in an
often quoted passage:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any
written.. . laws, it is he who is truly the law giver to all
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intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote
.them.",
Some judges that served on the Ohio Supreme Court after
1912, including Judges Allen, Donahue, Johnson, Wanamaker, and
Chief Justices Nichols and Marshall, by their opinions, attempted
to effectuate and liberalize the Home Rule provision of the con-
stitution. The dissents of Judge Turner, too, are in the spirit of
friendliness to our city Magna Charta. But it often appears to
home rule enthusiasts that the Court has displayed an opposition
comparable to the resentment Blackstone felt toward statutes.
These, he said,
"have destroyed common law symmetry, distorted its pro-
portions, exchanged its majestic simplicity for specious em-
bellishments and fantastic novelties."4
For instance, in the Lynch case,5 warning that the amendment
would not be allowed to go too far was implicit in the court's
opinion by Schauck, C. J., refusing a writ of mandamus to compel
the city auditor to certify an ordinance for acquisition of a munici-
pal motion *picture theatre. Judge Wanamaker, beginning his
twenty-five page dissenting opinion "I decisively dissent,",, referred
to People v. Hurlbtit7 as authority that there is an inherent right of
self-government in municipalities, which, he averred, should not be
sabotaged by limitations judicially imposed through narrow inter-
pretation of the new amendment. Opposing Chief Justice Schauck's
view that home rule does not permit cities to engage in business
competitive with private ventures,8 Judge Wanamaker cited the
great variety of such undertakings mentioned in Dillon which
even then 'had been -entered upon, without any home rule grant,
by English cities. The dissent further rightly urged that a moving
picture theatre might afford educational and recreational facilities.
But the prevailing adverse opinion said these were not its primary
purposes and served notice -that there would be definite limits put
by the court on any attempted.unrestrained uses of the home rule
amendment.
'Quoted in CuRTIs "LIONS UNDER THE THRONE," p. 235, from GRAY'S
NATURE AM SOURCES OF THE LAW, and in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's recent
address on "Some Reflection. on the Reading of Statutes,".- published by
the Association of the Bar of' the City of New York, 1947.
"WARDEN, THE BIoGRAPHY OF SIR WILLIA BLACKSTONE, p. 157.
'State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 X.E. 670
(1913).
'Id. at 125, 102 N.E. at 681.
'24 Mich. 44 (1871). This is an eloquent decision by the great Judge
Cooley. But, in view of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182
.(1023)-, it'cannot'now besaid to -epresent- the law.
'Such view is repeated in the city-garage case, Cleveland v. Ruple, 130
Ohio St. 405, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
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That notice and the inhospitable spirit in which this amend-
ment was received by the majority of the court are further evi-
denced by the first paragraph of the syllabus in the Lynch case,9
wherein it was declared that before a municipality could exercise
the powers of local self-government, it would have to frame or
adopt or amend a charter for its government. Not until ten years
later, in Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway was this misreading of
the amendment expressly disapproved'
The officials of the City of Cincinnati did little to take advan-
tage of or test the potentialities of municipal home rule from 1912
to 1926.11 They did resort in 1918 to an occupational tax to meet a
serious financial situation. State ex rel Zielonka v. Carrell12 legiti-
mated this home rule offspring, since the state had not pre-empted
the excise tax domain. But, limitations on the use of this tax were
later imposed in Cincinnati v. A.T.&T. Co.'3 where it was held that
the state had pre-empted this tax field as to telephone and other
companies. Although the occupational tax was repealed by the
Cincinnati Charter administration after its advent in 1926, re-
strictions on such a local tax are made more apparent by Haefner
v. City of Youngstown,"- another instance of where the state was
held to have pre-empted the taxing field. The third paragraph of the
syllabus is:
"Municipalities have power to levy excise taxes to raise
revenue for purely local purposes; but under Section 13,
Article XVIII of the constitution, such power may be lim-
ited by express statutory provision or by implication flow-
ing from state legislation which pre-empts the field by
levying the same or a similar excise tax."
At page 61 of the opinion it is again said the General Assembly
may impose the limitation not only expressly, but also impliedly.
It is a fair argument to say, however, this should not be so, and
that the mere fact the state has levied a tax or entered a field of
control is no reason why local subdivisions may not also levy a
tax or go into the field, unless the state has declared the state
exaction or control exclusive.z
'State ex tel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 102 N.E. 670
(1913).
"108 Ohio St. 245, 5th paragraph of syllabus, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
"THE GOVERNMENT OF CINcnmATI AND HAMILTON COUNTY, REED, ThE
CrTy Couxcm, 189, 191 (1924).
'99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
'112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E. 806 (1925).
'147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E. 2d 64 (1946).
"See 14 U. or CHI. L. REV. 297 (1947) criticizing adversely Neil House
Hotel v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58.N.E.2d 665 (1944) and the
extent to which the Ohio Supreme Court has gone in finding ordinances to
be in conflict with state law. Cf. The Globe Security, etc. Co. v. Carrel,
Auditor, 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 N.E. 364 (1922); The Marion Foundry Co. v.
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In Cincinnati v. Roettinger8 -the city was told emphatically
the home rule amendment would not permit use of surplus water
works receipts'for general municipal purposes.1 7 In Ohio and al-
most all other jurisdictions a city is said to hold, and operate its
water-works in what is termed its private or proprietary, not
governmental capacity.18 The distinction is so uncertain, illogical,
and shadowy that, if invoked at all, it should be limited to tortss
and not used as a guide for determining whether local home rule
provision or state enactment governs. But, as will appear later,
the Ohio Supreme Court has sometimes invoked the governmental
,proprietary test as a basis for solution of home rule questions.
The Cincinnatus Association, formed in Cincinnati shortly after
World War I, principally to discuss local 'and national affairs, was
a group of some fifty young citizens, mostly Republican by descent.
Study and debate opened the eyes of these voters; they saw how
deplorable were prevalent conditions in their locality; how mis-
leading is the shibboleth "party responsibility" in local affairs.
They took an interest in helping overcome the sway of the pro-
fessional politicians, and, in considerable number, these young men
of promise came to occupy positions in the non-partisan citizen
administrations that resulted. Before this group in 1923, the author
fired the initial salvo for change in an address condemning the
waste, incompetence and archaic form of the local government
"on the banks of the beautiful river" and sounded a solo call for
something of the kind later adopted.
The Association, by reason of the home rule amendment, was
enabled to chalk up one of its first successes when bringing about
Landes, Auditor, 112 Ohio St. 166, 147 N.E. 302 (1925); Holsman v. Thomas,
112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 750 (1925); King & Co. v. Horton, 116 Ohio St.
205, 223, 156 N.E. 124, 129 (1927); Mayer, Taxpayer v. Ames, Director, 133
Ohio St. 458, 14 N.E. 2d 617 (1938).
"105 Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922).
l"The use of surplus waterworks funds for general municipal purposes,
in Boston and elsewhere, is an unscientific, deceptive and discrimina-
tory method of taxation and poor technique, since it does not make ap-
parent to the citizens how high their taxes really are. But the legality of
such use does not-depend upon its wisdom, but whether self-executing §4
of Art. XVIII, permitting municipalities to operate municipally owned pub-
lic utilities, is, in any way qualified by §13 of Art. XVIII that
"Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to
levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes .... "
State ex rel. v. Bish, 104 Ohio St. 206, 135 N.E. 816 (1922); Pfau v.
Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E. 2d 172 (1943); Colley v. Village of
Englewood, 80 Ohio App. 540, 71 N.E. 2d 524 (1947).
"Interstate Sash Co. v.. City of Cleveland, 148 Ohio St. 325, 73 N.E. 2d
236 (1947); Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352, 357, 363 (1937); City of
Barberton v. Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934).
"Seasongood, Municipal Corporations; Objections to the Governmental
or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. Rlv. 910 (June 1936).
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adoption of daylight saving time, applicable to all municipal of-
fices and legal proceedings for the City of Cincinnati, and in effect
each year from the last of April to the last of September. It pre-
vailed upon an unwilling administration and council to submit
the issue at a primary election to be held in April, 1920. This was
before Eastern Standard Time was -adopted by statute for the
state. State ex rel. Cist v. City of Cincinnati adjudged that General
Code Sections 5979 and 5980, fixing conflicting time for the state,
applied only to state matters, but that Section 3, Article XVIII al-
lowed fixing by a city of its own time for its own purposes. 0
In 1925, the city council had submitted to it an ordinance
wherein rates for electricity were fixed for a ten year period be-
ginning October 8, 1925. Consumers felt the rate fixed was too
high and the ten year period too long, inasmuch as electric rates
were coming down steadily. The ordinance was passed, however,
over the mayor's veto. A few of us initiated a referendum to pre-
vent its taking effect. The petition was 'fied October 1, 1925, with
the city auditor, in accordance with what was thought the appli-
cable statute, General Code Section 4227-2. The filing was within
thirty days after the ordinance was passed over the mayor's veto,
but more than thirty days after the ordinance was first filed with
the mayor. The Company accepted the ordinance October 9, 1925.
Subsequently, one of its attorneys brought suit, as a taxpayer, to
prevent charging any other rates than the higher ones fixed in the
accepted ordinance.
Kuertz v. Union Gas & Electric Co.". held the referendum
proceedings void: first, because the petition had been fied with
the auditor under Section 4227-2 -2 rather than with the executive
authority of the city under Section 5 of Article XVIII; and, second,
because the filing was not in time, inasmuch as the referendum
petition should have been filed within thirty days from the first
filing with the mayor, and filing within thirty days from the over-
riding of the veto was insufficient. This latter proposition seems
obviously incorrect.2 3 What point would there be in a referendum
petition directed against an ordinance which had been vetoed?
The ordinance became effective only after being passed over the
veto; and the referendum review vouchsafed to cities should not
have been given a strained or unnatural interpretation. The first
point on which the case was decided, however, is sustained by the
later decisions of State ex rel. Mitchell v. Council of Village of
"101 Ohio St. 354, 129 N.E. 595 (1920).
"27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 221 (1927).
'City of Youngstown v. Craver, 127 Ohio St. 195, 187 N.E. 715 (1933).
'State ex rel. Diehl, Jr. v. Abele, 119 Ohio St. 210, 162 N.E. 807 (1928).
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Milan24 and State ex rel. City of Middletown v. City Commission of
Middletown.25
Nevertheless, the referendum petition served its purpose. In
November, 1924, long before the Kuertz decision in 1927, Cincinnati
adopted a home rule charter under Section 7 of Article XVIII of
the Ohio Constitution. In November, 1925, the city conducted the
first councilmanic election under its charter provision for the Hare
System of proportional representation. The new administration, in
1926, repealed the ten-year ordinance and passed another, fixing
a shorter period and lower rate, which would effect an annual
saving of about $750,000. The Company accepted this ordinance.
The charter, by its terms, calling for amplification, was sup-
plemented and in 1926 adopted, in substantially its present form.
Our city has thus operated under a home rule charter for more than
twenty-one years. In that time, it has displayed initiative and has
experimented. Some few of its attempts to be free of the restraints
of state law have succeeded and many, of which examples follow,
were rebuffed by court decisions, and failed.
This Charter" begins:
"We, the people of the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, in order
to secure home rule, do'adopt the following as the charter
of our city:
"Article I. Powers of the City
"The city shall have all the powers of local self-govern-
ment and home rule and all powers possible for a city to
have under the constitution of the state of Ohio. The city
shall have all powers that now or hereafter may be granted
to municipalities by the laws of the state of Ohio. All such
powers shall be exercised in the manner prescribed in this
charter, or if not prescribed herein, in such manner as shall
be provided by ordinance of the council.
"Article II. Legislative Power
"Section 1. All legislative powers of the city shall be
vested, subject to the terms of this charter and of the con-
stitution of the state of Ohio, in .the council. The laws of
the state of Ohio not inconsistent with this charter, except
those declared inoperative by ordinance of the council, shall
have the force and effect of ordinances of the city of
Cincinnati; but-in the event of conflict between any such
law and any municipal ordinance, or resolution the provi-
sions of the ordinance or resolution shall prevail and con-
trol."
Cincinnati was fortunate to have had Cleveland establish, in
1923, in the companion cases of Reutener v. Cleveland,27 and Hie
v. Cleveland,28 the constitutional validity of election of a council
'133 Ohio St. 499, 14 N.E. 2d 772 (1938).
'140 Ohio St. 368, 44 N.E. 2d 459 (1942).
'Charter and Code of. Ordinances, Cincinnati, 1945, p. 11.
"'107 Ohio St. 11, 141 N.E. 27 (1923).
'107 Ohio St. 144, 141 N.E. 35 (1923).
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by the Hare System. The single transferable vote, P.R. provision
has been one of the most valuable features of the charter.29 Our
city Bill of Rights was adopted over violent opposition, and the
P.R. method of election, the Charter's principal bastion, has been
subjected, over a period of years, to three tremendous but, hap-
pily, unsuccessful onslaughts. The first of these was at a primary,
the second at a special election, and the most recent and serious
occurred at the general municipal election of November, 1947.
In this last, the opposition press pointed out that the P.R. system
of voting had been declared unconstitutional in Michigan in Wattles
ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn.30 But, it was not disclosed that -the Ohio
Supreme Court had conclusively established constitutionality of
the Hare P.R. system in the Ohio cases before referred to. The
Michigan opinion had been expressly distinguished by Judge Allen
of the Ohio court in the Reutener case by reason of a more limited
power of local self-government in Michigan. Neither did the pub-
licity of the opposition refer to the more recent decision of John-
son v. City of New York,31 sustaining the P.R. method of election
in New York by virtue of the home rule powers granted, nor to
Moore v. Election Commissioners of Cambridge,2 a Massachusetts
case in which this method of election was validated for Cam-
bridge.3 3
The cases of Bising v. Cincinnati,24 State ex rel. Ellis v. Urner,3 5
and Witzelberg v. Cincinnati36 involved a catastrophic situation that
resulted temporarily when Cincinnati tried, under home rule pow-
ers, to save publication costs for official matter. The Ohio Supreme
Court displayed broad-mindedness in reversing its first decision
and thereby extricating the city from the calamitous results caused
by it. The council had availed itself of the provisions of General
Code Section 4676-1, which allow municipal corporations operating
under a special charter to authorize a method of publication of
legislation, the making of improvements and the levying of assess-
ments, differing from the method prescribed by general statute
law. Section 6 of Article II of our charter provides for publication
"in a newspaper of general circulation in the city of Cincinnati,
or a newspaper regularly published under the authority of council."
'Seasongood, The Merits of Proportional Representation in City Elec-
tions, 16 SOcIAL ScIcE 237 (July 1941).
1211 Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920).
-274 N.Y. 411, 9 N.E. 2d 30 (1937).
'309 Mass. 303, 35 N.E. 2d 222 (1941).
'Note, Constitutionality of Unorthodox Election Methods, 55 HARv. L.
REv. 114 (1941).
'126 Ohio St. 218, 184 N.E. 837 (1933).
"127 Ohio St. 84, 187 N.E. 76 (1933).
"6132 Ohio St. 216, 6 N.E. 2d 2 (1937). Dismissed for want of a federal
question, 302 U.S. 635 (1937).
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In May 1927, under ordinance of council, the regular publication
of the "City Bulletin" began, with a resultant saving to the city
as against publishing the matter in a regular newspaper estimated
to. be about $40,000 a year. In -the Bising case, the Supreme Court
ruled that the City Bulletin, because it had nothing in it except
official matter, was not a "newspaper" within the meaning of that
term in the ordinance and charter of Cincinnati, and, hence, that
publication of a notice of assessment in it was invalid. As General
Code Section 4233 provides that
"It shall be deemed a sufficient defense to any suit or
prosecution under an ordinance, to show that no such pub-
lication... as herein required was made."
the serious consequences of this decision will be apparent. A gas
rate ordinance, materially lowering rates, had been published in
the City Bulletin. The utility had appealed therefrom to the Public
Utilities Commission and moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground of the invalidity of the ordinance. The counsel for the Gas
Company was the successful counsel in the Bising case which in-
volved only a trifling assessment. The Union Terminal ordinance
had been similarly published -and the lack of publication clouded
the validity of titles and other important matters included in that
ordinance. Persons accused in the Municipal Court made the point
of lack of publication of the ordinances under which they were
prosecuted and were promptly -acquitted. Besides the Terminal
Company, numerous others interested in ordinances that had been
published in the Bulletin joined the city in a petition for rehearing.
It was overruled. Chaos prevailed.3 7 We were able to present the
matter "anew, however, in the Ellis case, a suit in mandamus to
require the auditor to certify a contract for expert services in the
gas rate litigation arising out of the Company's appeal from the
rate ordinance. The auditor's defense was that the ordinance was
void. In this second case, we showed such really immaterial facts
as that the Bulletin had been entered as second-class matter at the
Post Office and that it contained
"news and happenings of local and general interest,
social, political, moral, business, professional and educa-
tional intended for the information of the general reading
public of Cincinnati."
'After the Bising case, the author was employed as special counsel for
the city in the gas rate controversy. The disadvantages to which the city
is put under existing Ohio law in such controversies is recounted in "Those
Old Age Rate Cases," Seasongood, XV PUBLIC UTLnIES FORTNIGHTLY 702
(June 6, 1935), and in Seasongood, Chapter on John W. LBricker in "Public
Men In and Out of Office," University of North Carolina Press (1946). It
seems illogical that in fixing rates for private companies, home rule cities
should be subjected to the decisions of the state public utilities commission,
whereas by Ohio Gen. Code §614-2a municipalities owning and operating
their own utilities are free of such state control.
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The Court overruled the Bising decision, sustained the Bulletin as a
publication and, in June, 1933, allowed the writ, with five of the
judges, not including the Chief Justice, concurring, and one of the
judges not participating. The argument that publication in the
Bulletin, because of its small circulation -and otherwise, did not
constitute due process was finally set at rest in the Witzelberg case,
the third one of this series.
The original decision in the Bising case was indefensible; a
"newspaper" is a paper that prints news. There are many news-
papers that print only one kind of news. What was shown in the
second case did not legally differentiate it from the first case. In
retrospect, under the rule that res judicata extends not only to
what was actually decided but as well to what might have been
decided,3 8 the question should perhaps not even have been con-
sidered afresh. But the new matter adduced in the second case
afforded the -court opportunity to recede from an untenable posi-
tion and may be said to have saved home rule charter govern-
ment in Cincinnati.
In State ex rel. Schorr v. Viner,30 the Supreme Court, Judge
Allen not concurring and Marshall, C.J. not participating, rendered
an opinion seriously affecting that portion of the Queen City's
charter intended to discourage "voluntary" campaign contribu-
tions by city employees. Schorr, while legal counsel for the Board
of Rapid Transit Commissioners, in February 1928, was appointed
chairman of a party campaign committee for a primary election to
be held the following August. Those who had brought about the
charter administration in the city wished to protect, by electing
county officials in sympathy with rather than opposed to a non-
partisan, merit system, the good government gains that had been
won. Schorr, as campaign manager, was charged with violation of
Section 4, Article V of the city charter. In July, 1928, the Civil
Service Commission notified him of this charge of violation of the
charter provision that
"No person in the administrative service shall directly
or indirectly give, solicit or receive, or in any manner be
concerned in giving, soliciting or receiving any assessment,
subscription or contribution for any political party or for
any candidate."
The penalty for violation was forfeiture of the position held and
ineligibility to any municipal position for one year. The notice
advised Schorr the Commission would hold a hearing, so that,
if the facts showed this charter provision had been violated, his
'State ex rel. v. Bowen, 132 Ohio St. 583, 9 N.E. 2d 494 (1937); Coving-
ton & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Sargent, 27 Ohio St. 233 (1875); State ex
rel. Lanker v. Kelsey, 127 Ohio St. 332; id. at 588, 188 N.E. 4, 190 N.E. 456
(1933).
'119 Ohio St. 303, 164 N.E. 119 (1928).
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position would be vacated. Schorr brought suit for and obtained
a writ of prohibition against the Commission. The Court's opinion
pverruling respondent's demurrdr, was rather unrealistic in the
passage which' noted there was in the petition no allegation that
Schorr was in any way concerned With any contribution, nor that
by any act or conduct of his he was connected with or had any
contribution made; and, hence, there was no violation of the
charter provisions admitted or confessed in the petition.40
The provision against soliciting or receiving campaign con-
tributions is in the civil service portion of the charter and places
a general duty of enforcement on the Civil Service Commission with
respect to all persons in the administrative service, i.e., not in the
executive or legislative branch. Such work as the Rapid Transit
Commission did would seem to have been administrative, but the
court held that Schorr was not in the "administrative service"
within the purview, of Section 4, Article V of the City Charter.
Incidentally, this is one of the few instances where the Supreme
Court has issued the writ of prohibition; and it is a question
whether the Civil Service Commission should not have had the
authority, after hearing the evidence, to determine for itself, sub-
ject to court review, whether the facts justified and the law per-
mitted imposition -of the penalty.4 1'
The Supreme Court has decreed home rule for cities does not
extend to matters concerning the -courts.4 2 The original Municipal
Court Act for Cincinnati, General Code Section 1558-35, contained
a provision -that court -personnel, -such -as -clerks and bailiffs, should
be appointed under the merit system. But, for some reason, this
requirement had not been met and these officials were largely
political appointees. Their interest in political affairs at election
times interfered seriously with -the performance of their official
duties. The salaries of these court officials had been ,fixed after a
standardization study, in line with the pay of other city employees
doing comparable work. The administration called upon the Civil
Service Commission as the Constitution, Article XV, Section 10
implemented by law commanded, to vouch these attaches into the
classified service, not with the idea of prying them out, but to stop
the bad practices and political activity. An easy non-competitive
examination was given. A few were so incompetent they failed.
The General Assembly, however, in 1929 passed a special
act43 taking all our city court personnel out of the merit system, fix-
"Id. at 306, 164 N.E. at 120. . ..
"'State ex Tel. Moss v. Clair, 148 .Ohio St. 642 (1947).
"State ex Tel. Cherrington, Pros. Atty v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St.
468, 147 N.E. 647 (1925); State ex Tel. Ramey v. Davis, County Corers.,
'119 Ohio St. 596, 165 N.E. 298 (1929).
"119 Ohio Laws 45 amending OHio GEN. CODE §1558-35 and others.
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ing their number in excess of needs, and their minimum salaries at
figures considerably higher than were paid other city employees
under the standardized wage scale.44 This action of the General
Assembly was sustained in Ellis v. Urner.45 The conclusion that
such details relating to the personnel of Municipal Courts are out-
side the home rule domain seems wrong.4 6
There is also a non-home rule difficulty with the decision in
this case. Under Section 10 of Article XV of the constitution ap-
pointments and promotions in the civil service must be made
according to merit, ascertained as far as practicable by competitive
examinations. When once the General Assembly had enacted that
the court officials should be in the classified civil service and the
City Civil Service Commission had found it "practicable" to hold
examinations and to place them in the classified service, it was then
too late to decide, as the court did, that it was not practicable to
do so. On this ground, decisions of the highest courts of other
jurisdictions have been different from that of the Ohio Supreme
Court.47
It would be a distinct help to forward-looking cities if they
could include in their charters provisions covering the establish:
ment, operation and maintenance of their own municipal courts
as is sanctioned in Michigan by a 1927 amendment to the Home
Rule Act.48
With respect to Cincinnati's home rule development through en-
lightened city planning, the Ohio Supreme Court has also rendered
"Representatives of half a dozen of the leading good government agen-
cies in Cincinnati made a special trip to Columbus to oppose the bill, but
without avail.
'125 Ohio St. 246, 181 N.E. 22 (1932).
"State ex rel. Stanley v. Bernon, 127 Ohio St. 204, 187 N.E. 733 (1933).
"Friedman v. Finegan, 268 N.Y.- 93, 196 N.E. 755 (1935). The Ellis v.
Urner decision. is logically followed in Underwood v. Isham, Judge, 61
Ohio App. 129, 22 N.E. 2d 468 (1939), appeal dismissed 135 Ohio St. 320, 20
N.E. 2d 719 (1939), where a city charter placing bailiffs, clerks, etc. of its
Municipal Court in'the classified service was declared invalid because the
General Assembly had exempted such positions; also in State ex rel. Welsh
v. Hoffman, 68 Ohio App. 171,40 N.E. 2d 204 (1941), regarding the Youngs-
town Municipal Court. In DeWoody, v. Underwood, 136 Ohio St. 575, 27 N.E.
2d 240 (1940), following State ex rel. Ryan v. Kerr, 126 Ohio St. 26, 183
N.E. 535 (1932), a charter provision for city legal counsel being selected and
put in the classified service was invalidated. Cf. easongood, Should the
Merit System Be Used in Making Appointments of Lawyers for Public
Service, 15 U. or CiN. L. REV. 209 (1941).
"MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL R.visw, No. 11, November, 1947, p. 123. This
Review is the official publication of the Michigan Municipal League, an
association of Michigan cities and villages organized in 1899 for improve-
ment of municipal government by united action. It, in turn, is a member of
the American Municipal Association with eight thousand municipal mem-
bers in forty-two states.
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constriktive decisions establishing the supremacy of conflicting state
statute over local planning procedures. In State' ex rel. Ellis v.
Blakemore,49 county plans for constructing a viaduct over a city
street were disapproved- by the City Planning Commission, which
pointed out that a shorter and less expensive structure would
serve the purpose equally well and save perhaps $800,000. Con-
sent to the county plans was, nevertheless, given by a five-to-four
vote of the council. The mayor and the clerk caused the journal
to read that the conseiit ordinance had failed. The Supreme Court,
however, issued a writ of mandamus to compel correction of the
record, holding that neither the charter nor General Code Section
4366-2, requiring a two-thirds vote to override disapproval by the
Planning Commission, relates to a bridge or viaduct on an inter-
county or main market road. Among the reasons given 'by the
City Planning Commission for its disapproval was not only the
useless expense of this project as planned by the county, 50' but
that if so large a sum were lavished on this one viaduct, resources
would not be available for other paralleling arteries of travel,
necessary for access to and from the western section of the city
and county.
Another hindrance to good local planning is Cincinnati v.
Wess.51 There the holding is that, notwithstanding Article VII,
Section 5, of Cincinnati's charter which requires, for a council
street vacation, consent .of the Planning Commission or overridifig
by two-thirds -of the council, a court may vacate, under General
Code Section 3730, without reference to the charter provision. Or-
dinarily, a Planning Commission would' have better means of as-
certaining aid more expert knowledgt than a judge, whether the
vacatibn would be injurious to the orderly development of the
region. A civic-minded jurist could, it ]is true, ask, before deciding,
foi an -advisory opinion from the Commission. But he might be
literal and not civic-mnnded and grant a Vacation which 'a city
planner would have envisaged as a most regrettable impairment
of future traffic routes. This decision has anothdr unfortunate-as:
pect. In Cincinnati, before a petition for council- vacation of a
street would be considered, the petitioner was required to deposit
two-thirds of the -appraised value of the portion of the street to
'116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927). Marshall, C. J. and Jones, J.
not concurring.
'As just ,one instance of how the same service can be rendered more
esthetically and cheaply by superior tecbiiilu6, :the county plans called: f6r
separate poles for various electric services such as overhead Street Railway
trplley ,wirps, :electric lighting, etc., whereas the city practice was to hang
all, such, seivices; bn one pole.'A decided difference in appearance can be
noted by. comparison of city. charter constructed Harrison Avenue viaduct
and the parallel, :county machine constructed Eighth Street viaduct.-,-
"127 Ohio St. 99, 186 N.E. 855 (1933).
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which he would succeed on vacation. If vacation were not ordered,
the sum would be returned. This was thought fair in view of the
great benefit to the abutter if a portion of often valuable property
in a street or alley vacated would become his. But if court vaca-
tions are ordered without such payment, the owner of abutting
property will often choose these in order to get a valuable wind-
fall not obtainable without payment otherwise.52
State ex rel. Arey v. Sherril 53 is the culmination of a series
of decisions striking down Cincinnati's use of certain desirable home
rule procedures. The charter provides in Article IV, Section 1, for
a city manager to be
"the chief executive and administrative officer of the city
and not necessarily when elected, a resident of the city or
state."
Under Article IV, Section 3, he is
"to make all appointments and removals in the adminis-
trative and executive service .... "
The council twice appointed a city manager who was not a resi-
dent of the city or state "solely on the basis of his executive and
administrative qualifications," in keeping with the charter. This
provision conflicts, assuming the city manager to be an officer,54
with Section 4, Article XV, and Section 1, Article V of the Ohio
Constitution, requiring officers to be electors, but prevails.5 Here
is a great advantage, since a city manager without local ties or
commitments and possessing special training and qualifications
that might not be enjoyed by a resident, comes in under favorable
auspices.
But, in the Arey case, the Supreme Court dealt a severe blow
to the council-manager system and home rule in prohibiting the
manager from trying a policeman and in ruling that the Ohio
statute law, requiring policemen and firemen to be under a
director of safety, overrode the provisions of the .charter.66a
The court held that a safety director, provided for in General
'While there is no express statute authorizing such procedure, similar
statutes elsewhere have been sustained. People ex rel. Hill v. Eakin, 383
Ill. 383, 50 N.E. 2d 474 (1943). It is thought, therefore, that home rule
permits an Ohio city to adopt such procedure. Resort to a court instead of
council vacation can by-pass such an exaction.
'142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E. 2d 501 (1944).
'City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96, 61 S.W. 2d 1092 (1933).
-Reutener v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N.E. 27 (1923) and Hile
v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 144, 141 N.E. 35 (1923).
'Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 182 P. 2d 762 (Okla. 1947), upholding
city manager's removal of a policeman for refusal to resign from member-
ship in Fraternal Order of Police. At page 764, this opinion states:
"We believe it firmly established that the provisions of the city charter
relating to the removal or discharge of appointed officers or employees,
are solely matters of municipal concern and control over the general laws."
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Code Section 4367, 4368; 4380, must be the official to hear the cause
of suspension and to render judgment thereon, to make appoint-
ments of police officers and to supervise them. .Yet, many pre-
vious decisions of the same court had declared local government
includes the power to select-officers and define their duties and
powers contrary to general laws of the state.56 A policeman is gen-
erally regarded as an officer.5 7 Moreover, there is no real conflict
between the charter and Section 4368, which provides:
".... He [the director of public safety] shall have all
powers and duties connected with and incident to the ap-
pointment, regulation and government of these depart-
ments (police and fire departments) except as otherwise
provided by law.. .. "
So there is to be a director of public safety over the police and
fire departments' with the following exception, namely, "except as '
otherwise provided by law." A charter is "law."58 The whole read-
ing of these sections shows them inapplicable, to a city charter.
Section 4367 says the director of public safety shall be appointed
by the mayor. Section 4368 begins:
"Under the direction of the mayor, the director of pub-
lic safety shall be the executive head of the police and fire
departments."
This section also gives him other duties wholly inconsistent with
the city manager idea that all administrative power shall be lodged
exclusively ii the manager. The inappositeness of these sections to
the city manager city is evident from Section 4369 which says
such director shall make all contracts in the name of the city with
reference to the management of such departments and for the
purchase of all supplies necessary for such departments. Section
4370 says he shall manage and make all contracts in reference to
police stations, infirmaries, hospitals,. pesthouses, and all other
charitable and reformatory institutions. Section. 4371 allows the
safety director to make contracts and expenditures of money for
acquiring lands for the erection of station houses and for the ur-
chase of engines, apparatus and all other supplies necessary for
police and fire departments. The optional plan statutes, Sections
3515-17, -25, -29 expressly allow creation and discontinuance of of-
fices, departments, and employments in the commission plan, city
manager plan and federal plan. It is only where of -the three pat-
OState ex rel. Aut. Registering etc. Co. v. Green, 121 Ohio St. 301, 168
N.E. 131 (1929); State ex rel. Stanley v. Bernon, 127 Ohio St. 204, 187 N.E.
733 (1933).
"Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E. 2d 972 (1940).
'In Holsman-v. Thomas,, City Clerk, 112 Ohio St. 397, 147 N.E. 75(
(1925), the holding is that the licensing of an auctioneer under OHIO GEN.
CoDE §5868, "according to law by the common pleas judge" did not prevent
a Cleveland ordinance limiting auctions of jewelry to sixty days in the
year, etc. under Section 3 of Article 3IIT.
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terns offered by the General Assembly for local adoption the federal
plan is adopted that, under Section 3515-41 there is to be a director
of public safety appointed by the mayor.
Since the General Assmbly has expressly provided that posi-
tions such as safety director may be discontinued in the optional
commission and city manager plans of government, and since only
the strong mayor plan contemplates necessity of a safety director
appointed by him, is it not reasonable to suppose that a city adopt-
ing a council-manager charter under direct self-executing con-
stitutional permission may have the same choice as to whether it
shall have a safety director and as to what his powers shall be?
The logic of the court's decision might well be that since Section
4367 requires appointment of a safety director by the mayor, the
maker of the appointment also was a matter of state concern and
that the mayor, rather than the city manager, would be required
to make this key appointment.
The Arey case relies on and outdoes Cincinnati v. Gamble."
There the city had adopted, after careful study, an actuarially
sound pension and retirement scheme. The police and firemen's
fund was in bad shape financially and on an unscientific basis. The
police and the firemen, as all city employees, were included on one
retirement plan which would have worked to their advantage.
The holding was that the state law relating to police and firemen
pensions and retirement fund was supreme and could pot be super,
seded by charter provisions for these.
In State ex rel. Strain v. Houston ° the state two-platoon law
for firemen was held to prevail over a Cincinnati ordinance saying
it should not. The basis of the decision is that fire protection is a
matter of state concern and, therefore, the state is supreme. In the
Gamble case, in In re Fortune6' and in State ex rel. Daly v.
Toledo,62 the argument is that nothing of state concern and regard-
ing which the state has acted is comprised within the home rule
grant. But Section 3, Article XVIII, of the Ohio Constitution does
not compel such a conclusion. There, municipalities are given au-
thority: first, to exercise all powers of local self-government and
second, to adopt "local police, sanitary and other similar regula-
tions," not in conflict with general law. The second should
not limit the first. Also, unde the ejusdem generis canon
of construction, "similar regulations" should be of the general char-
acter of the specific "police" 'and "sanitary" regulations enumer-
ated. It is almost a play on words to say, as some of these decisions
do, any matter relating to the police is a police'regulation. Police
'138 Ohio-St. 220, 34 N.E. 2d 226 '(1941). -
'138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E. 2d 219 (1941).
0138 Ohio St. 385, 35 N.E. 2d 442 (1941).
"142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E. 2d 338 (1943).
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regulation has a definite and well understood meaning, i.e., a regu-
lation under the police power for the general good.6 3 The dissent-
ig opinion of Judge Turner in the Gamble case points out that
police and fire departments are made up of municipal employees
and their employment, discharge, organization, pay, pensions, etc.,
should remain matters of local self-government until the state, by
general laws, takes over the city police and fire departments. The
court in the Gamble case cites the decisions of other states that
fire and police retirement funds are objects of state concern; but it
is believed no other court has gone so far as has ours in the Arey
case making it impossible for a city to decide how its own police
officers shall be disciplined. The Gamble case reasons that city
home rule cannot extend to functions which a city performs in it§
governmental capacity, citing Wooster v. Arbenz.6' But that case
holds merely the city is not liable in tort for negligence in repair-
ing or constructing a street since these activities are governmental.
Such a test is troublesome enough in the tort field, and full of ex-
ceptions, 5 and its use for determining the extent of a constitutional
grant of home rule powers to cities seems particularly inappropri-
ate.
Cincinnati's efforts to use the power of excess condemnation,
conferred in Section 10, Article XVIII, of the Ohio Constitution,
have been halted by court decisions. Resort to this power, in 1927,
seemed a way out of difficulty, caused by insistent demands
of powerful groups to widen a short downtown stretch of
three blocks of a main thoroughfare. The cost of ordinary
condemnation of the property required was bound to be
heavy and beyond the city's resources if other urgent
meritorious improvements were to be made. So, excess con-
demnation procdedings were begun. But, as the city had not
been able to- determine, with any definiteness, just what it
would do with the property to be condemned in excess of
that , actually needed for the widening of the street, its resolution
of 'necessity under General Code Section- 3679, was in general
terms. A property owner-resisted the taking. In Cincinnati v.
Vester 6 Judge Hickenlooper-, writing- the courts opinion, seemed-
to rest it on the ground that Section 10 of Article XVIII in the Ohio
Constitution violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
'King & Co. v. Horton, 116 Ohio St. 205, 156 N.E. 124 (1927).
S61116 Ohio St.,281, 156.E. 210 (1927). . "
'A city acting in its governmental capacite-ioliabe'for injury if.its
actions constitute a nuisance, just as if it' 'er a'ctiiig in a 5rivate capacity.
Cleveland v. Feriando,-114 Ohio St. 207, 150 N.E.,747 (1926); District
of Columbia-v. Totte'n, 5 F,2d 374 (App. D.C. 1924), certiorari denied, 269
US.* 562 (1925).
-33 F. 2d 242 (C.C.A. 6th 1929).. - - .
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Constitution. The United States Supreme Court, however, granted
certiorari and affirmed the order of injunction 7 only on the narrow
ground that the proceedings were not taken in conformity with
the applicable law of the state. The court refrained from express-
ing an opinion whether there is any force in Section 10, Article
XVI.68 Subsequently, in City of East Cleveland v. Nau,0 it ap-
peared that that city purposed taking an excess of land beyond the
amount required for extension and widening of a street. The legis-
lation set forth that the excess was needed for slope grading for
lateral support for the improvement. The lower courts found that
the larger portion of the excess land was not necessary for such
purpose and that in fact, it was not being appropriated for such
asserted use. Under these circumstances, the supreme court en-
joined the taking of the excess amount, asserting:
"we cannot sanction an arbitrary and unreasonable taking
of excess private property for the contemplated use, under
the guise that it is necessary for the improvement, where
the weight of the evidence shows it to be otherwise."
Why not, if the real purpose was legitimate? But this decision has
been referred to as indicating that Section 10 of Article XVIII has
been expunged from the Ohio Constitution.0 It is believed, how-
ever, that this power properly exercised still exists and will be
sustained if it is again questioned in the federal courts.71 But what
its ability to survive will be in Ohio courts is uncertain.
That fate assumes new importance in the redevelopment laws,
being enacted in many states. The usual pattern of these laws is
that after redevelopment has been achieved, the property may be
sold to private individuals and freed of restrictions. Yet, such laws
have been upheld in the courts.7 2
Decisions, too, in cases originating in other Ohio citieg have
strait-jacketed the full development of home rule in them and in
Cincinnati. State ex rel v. Semple, decided that the municipality
could not contribute dues to 'a "Conference of Ohio Munici-
palities.'7 3 The decision was announced in a per curiam in which
Chief Justice Marshall and Judge Allen did not concur, in which
"280 U.S. 545 (1929); 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
'See 4 U. or Cn'. L. REV. 94; and Bevis, Excess Confdemndfio% id. 474
(1930).
'124 Ohio St. 433, 179 N.E. 187 (1931).
"Tooke, NAT. MUNIc. REV., April 1935, p. 25, footnote 3.
'6 U. or CiN. L. REV. 196 (1932); Constittionatita t of Excess Cdndem-
nation, 46 COL. L. REv. 108 (1946).
'
2People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 394 1I. 477, 68 X.E. 2d 761
(1946); City Housing Authority v. Mueler, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E. 2d 163
(1936); Belovsky v. Redevelopteint Authofity of City of Philadelphia, 54
A. 2d 277 (Pa. 1947).
"112 Ohio St. 559, 148 N.E. 342 (1925).
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Judge Kinkade concurred only in the judgment, and in which. it
was stated the Director of Laws office represented both sides "in
a rather perfunctory presentation of the question." As a result of
this ruling, efforts here to organize such a conference failed for
lack of ability of the constituents to pay dues. Thereby, the court
prevented Ohio municipalities from enjoying the obvious benefits
of such an organization of which prototypes exist in more than
half the states of the Union, often with headquarters at a univer-
sity.74 The basis of the court's decision is disturbing. The opinion
is minatory:
"It does not follow, from the broad powers of local self-
government conferred by Article XVIII of the Constitution
of -the state, that a municipal council may expend public
funds indiscriminately and for any purpose it may de-
sire.. .without considering the validity of such a provi-
sion... there is no express provision of the charter... rela-
tive to the contribution from the treasury of the city...,
and no general provision from which authority may be in-
ferred to expend the funds of the city to assist in creating
and maintaining, an organization with offices and officers
entirely separate from those of the city, selected by repre-
sentatives of various municipalities of the state, with sal-
aries and expenses also fixed by them.17 5
This seems tantamount to a'statement that Ohio home rule cities
have only the powers that non-home rule cities can exercise,
namely, such as -are expressly granted and those necessarily im-
plied"8 or that there must be some express provision in a charter
to exercise powers of local self-government. But, as before men-
tioned, the constitutional grant of home rule power to municipali-
ties in Article XVIII is self-executing and extends equally to mu-
nicipalities which do or do not, adopt a charter.7 7
One can only hope that ff this question should be thoroughly
presented anew, the court would recede from its position as it did
in the Bising case, supra, and as it did in City *of Middletown v.
City Commigsion of Middletown,"' overruling, without expressly
d6ihg so, Villdge of Br'ewster V. Hil,"9 after that case had been ext-
pr6e.sly disapproved by a lower court in Vollmer v. Village of
Amherst.8 1 In the Brewster case, an arrangement by the village- tor
"Cf. note 48, fupra and Hayeg v. Kalamazoo,, 316 Mich. 443, 25 N.W.2d 787 (1947), annotated fA9 A.LR. 1218 (1947), ffie latest case upholding,
c6ntribution to such a league as for a public purpose, even though part
of its activities were concerned with state legislation.
"f12 Ohio St. 969, 560, 148 N'.E. 342, 343 (1925),
'I DiLLON, MuxicrAxm COopoRATiof'S 937 (5th ed.- 1911).
" Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, supra, note 10 tyl, part. 1, 4 And 5,
16 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
*'38" Ohio St. 566, 37 NE. 2d 606 (1941),
'128 Ohio St. 3439, 190 N.E. 766 (1994Y.
'65 Ohio App. 26, 29 N.E. 2d 3 (19405,
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issue mortgage revenue bonds to finance construction of an electric
generating plant to be operated as a unit with its own eltctric
distribution system was held to be pledging of credit prohibited by
Section 6, Article VIII, although payment was to be made only
from revenues of the system. In the two cases, it was pointed out
Sections 4 and 12- of Article XVIII relating to the acquisition
of utilities and issuing bonds therefor are self-executing and self-
sufficient and that these sections of home rule Article XVIII are
not affected by other parts of the Constitution.
Another decision impinging upon city home rule is Wilson v.
City of East Cleveland2,1 to the effect that a municipal corporation
is without power to prescribe by charter a condition precedent to
liability for breach of the duty imposed upon it by the requirement
of Section 3714 of the General Code that streets "be kept open, in
repair and free from nuisance." Such enactments, requiring that
notice of claim be given within a stipulated time of the date of in-
jury, are common in many states and are sustained, even in non-
home rule states, as reasonable conditions8 2 of assertion of liability.
The decision is especially unfortunate for Cincinnati, which, recog-
nizing the injustice of the defense of exemption of liability based
on governmental capacity has, by ordinance, waived such immun-
ity.8 3 A city should not be penalized for its fairness by having to
meet claims first asserted too late for thorough investigation and
preservation of the testimony of material witnesses.
Concerning civil service, the Supreme Court in its earlier de-
cisions after 1912, held it was generally a matter of municipal con-
cern and subject to regulation and control by the municipality."
In re Fortune5 was a volte face. It ruled that Section 486-17a,
giving police and firemen court appeal, was a matter of state-wide
concern, which governed over an ordinance making the decision of
the Civil Service Commission final.8 6
Other instances of judicial hobbling of municipal home rule
powers could be adduced. But those that have been mentioned
show that the Ohio Supreme Court has placed a restricted meaning
on "authority to exercise all powers of local self-government" and
'121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
'The case is adversely criticized, Hitchcock, Ohio Ordinances in Conflict
with General Laws, 16 U. oF CmN. L. REv. 1 (1942).
'SEASONGOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMFNT n THE UNITED STATES, p. 133, note 1,
supra.
"State ex rel. Lentz v. Edwards, 90 Ohio St. 305, 107 N.E. 768 (1914);
Hile v. Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 144, 141 N.E. 35 (1923).
"138 Ohio St. 384, 34 N.E; 2d 984 (1941).
"See, also, State ex rel. O'Driscoll, Taxpayer v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516,
37 N.E. 2d 49 (1941); State ex rel. Giovanello v. Village of Lowellville,
139 Ohio St. 219, 39 N.E. 2d 527 (1942); State ex rel. Daly v. City of Toledo,
142 Ohio St. 123, 50 N.E. 2d 338 (1943).
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has interpreted such "local police, sanitary and other similar regu-
lations as are not in conflict with general laws" to include as in con-
flict, all matters thought to be of state-wide concern, a wide area
embracing not alone health and police power matters but regula-
tions concerning police and firemen, the conduct of elections, 87 edu-
cation, regulation of public utilities, debts and taxes, courts -and
administration of justice.8
The ideal which Timothy Walker seeks to establish in his
"Introduction to American Law, 89 that "a judge should be an in-
tellectual statue," is impossible of attainment. Training, climate of
opinion, experience, feelings and habits of thought are Pygmalion
forces which cause the statue to be animated, to be like other
human beings and to tend to divagate towards one path or otlher.
Wth these vari~abl~,' itf us -no-t-'tr-aii7'e'th6'e arie &e-isfons, in o_6tierf
states, somewhat similar to the majority views of the Ohio Supreme
Court on almost identical home rule questions; or that there should
be many judges who interpret home rule provisions more liberally
for the cities.
Again, attainment of true home rule does not depend entirely
on judicial pronouncements. Other factors can make it not barme-
cide, but irrefragable. The article entitled "Let Cities Manage
Themselves" by the experienced administrator and professor of
political science of Ohio State University, Dr. Harvey Walker,90 is
well summarized in the head line following the title, "Home rule
will continue to be hampered unless legislators, city officials and
judges learn to understand its aims."' 1
"State ex rel. Blank Book Co. v. Ayres, Auditor, 142 Ohio St. 216, 51
N.E. 2d 636 (1943).
'As regards the amendment adopted in 1933 of Article X granting op-
portunities for county home rule, State ex rel. Howland v. Krause, et al.,
Board of Elections, 130 Ohio St. 455, 200 N.E. 512 (1936) (commented on
5 Ohio Op. 64, case comment O.S.U. students, IX.Ohio Bar p. 92 (1936);
Gale Lowrie, 10 U. oF, CiN. L. REV. 454 (November 1936) has made the hope
of getting serviceable county home rule charters illusory. County home rule
is outside the scope of this paper. But, seemingly, the court's attitude to-
wards that much needed improvement in local government is the same as
has been described towards municipal home rule, with the result that sup-
porters of it hive had to content themselves by echoing Angelo, in Measure
for Measure, "... let us hope: The Law hath not been dead though it hath
slept."
'Cited in CARE, THE OLD CouRT HousE 375 (1880).
936 NAT. MuNic. REV., No. 11, p. 19 (December 1947).
"To the same effect, but including teachers, students, and lawyers, as
soldiers for an invincible home rule lgion, see, SEASONGOOD, CASES ON
MuNiciPAL CoPpoRATxoNs, (2d ed. 1941), preface iv; Seasongood, Should
Lawyers Be Citizens? 36 NAT. Mumc. Rrv,, No. 9 (October 1947), reprinted
from Vol. Harvard Law School Record, No. 9 (September 11, 1946).
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In 1952, there will be opportunity for strengthening Article
XVIII by constitutional amendment so as to give cities a more
genuine home rule, vital to them. 2 The cities are faced, in this
era of rapid changes, with multiple problems: loss of population
due to hegiras toward outlying territory, rising salary and other
costs, insistent demands for many new and expanded services, and
diminished revenues. If, therefore, these governmental agencies
are to persist, as democracy requires they should, vigorous and
efficient, it is essential they be recognized as great business corpora-
tions as well as instrumentalities of government; that their aspira-
tions be sympathetically regarded; and that, in the development of
their own personalities and lawful aims, they be awarded irrefrang-
ible home rule powers.
'Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution provides that at a general
election every twentieth year after 1932 the question of whether there
should be a convention to revise, alter or amend the Constitution shall be
submitted to the electors and that, in case of favorable vote, the General
Assembly, at its next session, provide for the election of delegates and the
assembling of such convention, the convention in turn to submit amend-
ments agreed upon to the electors for adoption by a majority of those vot-
ing. This opportunity should not be neglected.
[Vol. 9
